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The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature 
on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision-making so 
far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present an 
experiment with 825 participants, using six different coordination games, where either 
individuals or teams interact with each other. We find that teams coordinate much more 
efficiently than individuals. This finding adds one important cornerstone to the recent 
literature on the conditions for successful coordination. We explain the differences between 
individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model. 
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1.  Introduction 
Coordination problems prevail in a large variety of contexts, such as organizational 
design, technology adoption and diffusion, monopolistic competition, speculative attacks on 
currency markets, or bank runs, to name just a few (see, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, 1980, 
James W. Friedman, 1994, Colin F. Camerer and Marc J. Knez, 1997, or Russell Cooper, 
1999, for more examples). Due to the ubiquity of coordination problems and the eminent 
importance of successful coordination for the functioning of firms, organizations, or 
industries, there is a large body of research in economics on coordination games with 
multiple, often Pareto-ranked, pure strategy equilibria.
1 The equilibrium selection problems in 
these games resemble informal, decentralized coordination in situations which are hard to 
govern by explicit contracts. Since the determinants for coordination failure or success can 
more easily be controlled for and identified in laboratory studies than in field studies, most of 
the work on coordination has relied on controlled experiments, starting with the seminal 
papers by John B. van Huyck, Richard C. Battalio and Richard O. Beil (1990, 1991) and 
Russell Cooper et al. (1990, 1992). Strikingly, though, when examining the determinants of 
coordination failure or success, all experimental studies have exclusively focused on 
individual decision-making so far. 
In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. In their classic book 
The Wisdom of Teams, Jon R. Katzenbach and Douglas K. Smith (1993) emphasize that the 
“team is the basic unit of performance for most organizations” (p. 27). Knez and Duncan 
Simester (2001) present a very illuminating field study of the importance of team decision-
making in coordination game. They have studied the influence of incentive systems on the 
success of coordination at Continental Airlines. In particular, this airline offered a firm-wide 
bonus to all employees if specific on-time arrival and departure performance goals were met. 
                                                 
1 Coordination games have not only captured so much interest because they resemble many relevant real-
world situations, but also because they are interesting from a genuine game-theoretical perspective, as they 
address the non-trivial issue of equilibrium selection (John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten, 1988).   2
This required the efficient coordination of several work teams on the ground (at the starting 
and landing airport) and in the air. Hence, Knez and Simester’s (2001) case study serves as a 
prime example for coordination among teams. They were not interested in whether 
coordination among teams was more or less successful than coordination among individuals, 
though. In fact, except for two very recent papers by Gary Charness and Matthew O. Jackson 
(2007, 2008), the literature has not yet addressed the comparative performance of individuals 
and teams in coordination games. Charness and Jackson (2007, 2008) have examined a Stag 
Hunt-game, which is a two-player coordination game. Two persons formed one group (i.e., 
one player). There was no interaction within a group other than each member deciding 
individually for one of the two strategies (Stag or Hare). In different treatments they varied 
the rule how the two decisions were aggregated to the group’s decision. Comparing the results 
across treatments shows that group play can be more or less efficient than individual play 
(where only two subjects play the two-person Stag Hunt game). If it is sufficient that one 
group member chooses the more efficient strategy (Stag) to implement that as the group 
decision, then group play is more efficient than individual play. If both group members have 
to choose Stag to implement it as the group decision, individual play is more efficient. 
In this paper, we present a large-scale experimental study with 825 participants in order 
to examine whether individual or team decision-making has any influence on coordination 
failure or success. Our approach differs from Charness and Jackson (2007, 2008) in the 
following ways: (i) We set up teams of three members each. Team members can communicate 
with each other before making a decision, as this opportunity seems to characterize team 
decision-making in many contexts. (ii) We let five – instead of only two – parties interact with 
each other. Since an increase in the number of interacting parties has been found to make 
efficient coordination more difficult (Roberto A. Weber, 2006), it seems warranted to 
examine coordination behavior of individuals and teams under such more demanding 
conditions. (iii) We study six different coordination games – two weakest-link games and four   3
average-opinion games – in order to check the robustness of our results. Our results show that 
teams are persistently and remarkably better at coordinating efficient outcomes than 
individuals are. Therefore, our study adds an important cornerstone to the recent literature on 
the determinants
2 of successful and efficient coordination. 
The seminal contributions on experimental coordination games (van Huyck et al., 1990, 
1991; Cooper et al., 1990, 1992) left many researchers with the impression that coordination 
failure is a common phenomenon (Chip Heath and Nancy Staudenmayer, 2000; Camerer, 
2003). Coordination failure was, and is, understood as a group of subjects either failing to 
coordinate on one of the multiple equilibria of Pareto-ranked coordination games (denoted as 
“miscoordination” in the following) or coordinating on a Pareto-dominated, i.e., inefficient, 
equilibrium due to subjects’ strategic uncertainty about the other subjects’ choices.
3 
Subsequent research has identified many factors that facilitate efficient coordination, with 
many of these factors typically applying in firms and organizations. In our discussion we 
focus here on financial incentives, communication, and group size.
4 Financial incentives – 
which make the payoff-dominant equilibrium more attractive in relation to the risk-dominant 
one – have been shown to increase the efficiency of coordination. This means that if the 
attractiveness of more efficient equilibria is reinforced through additional payments (Brandts 
and Cooper, 2006a, 2006b; John Hamman, Scott Rick and Weber, 2007)
5 or through a 
                                                 
2 Note that the excellent survey on behavior in coordination games by Giovanna Devetag and Andreas 
Ortmann (2007) does not mention teams as a possible factor. 
3 See Vincent P. Crawford (1991, 1995) for theoretical treatments of behavior in coordination games and how 
strategic uncertainty can affect the adaptive behavior of subjects in these games. 
4 The survey by Devetag and Ortmann (2007) also discusses other factors, like intergroup competition (Gary 
Bornstein, Uri Gneezy and Rosemarie Nagel, 2002), number of repetitions (Siegfried Berninghaus and Karl-
Martin Ehrhart, 1998), feedback effects (Devetag, 2003, Jordi Brandts and David J. Cooper, 2006b), or matching 
effects (David Schmidt et al., 2003). A recent paper by Crawford, Gneezy and Yuval Rottenstreich (2008) shows 
that salient labels may also promote more efficient coordination, but only as long as payoffs are symmetric. Even 
minutely asymmetric payoffs yield a very large degree of miscoordination in their two-person coordination 
games. 
5 Brandts and Cooper (2006a) and Hamman et al. (2007) agree on the effectiveness of financial incentives, 
but report different results with respect to the persistence of positive effects of financial incentives after they 
have been removed again. In Brandts and Cooper (2006a) coordination remains efficient even after the increased 
financial incentives have been abolished again, whereas in Hamman et al. (2007) coordination deteriorates when 
bonuses are removed. Hamman et al. (2007) explain the different findings by the different design of financial 
incentives. Whereas in Hamman et al. (2007) bonuses are only paid when the most efficient equilibria are   4
decrease in the effort costs for more efficient equilibria (Jacob Goeree and Charles A. Holt, 
2005), then one can regularly observe more efficient coordination. 
Communication is another important factor that can prevent coordination failure. The 
efficiency-increasing effect of pre-play cheap-talk communication – already documented in 
Cooper et al. (1992) – has been strongly confirmed in more recent studies on two-person 
coordination games (see, e.g., Charness, 2000, or John Duffy and Nick Feltovich, 2002, 
2006). However, Andreas Blume and Ortmann (2007) – using the experimental designs of van 
Huyck et al. (1990, 1991) – have shown for the first time that costless cheap-talk through 
signaling one’s intended action can yield efficient coordination even in large groups (of nine 
individuals).
6 
Group size is another crucial factor for efficient coordination. Starting with van Huyck et 
al. (1990, 1991), the general evidence is that larger groups are less likely to coordinate on an 
efficient equilibrium (absent communication; see Blume and Ortmann, 2007). Table 2 in 
Weber (2006) provides a nice overview on several coordination experiments with different 
group sizes, showing that coordination gets less efficient with a larger group size. In his own 
study, however, Weber (2006) demonstrates how the negative effects of group size on the 
likelihood of efficient coordination can be avoided. Knowing that coordination is typically 
successful in very small groups, Weber (2006) sets up groups of two subjects each in the 
beginning and lets them grow by adding individuals step by step until the group includes 12 
subjects. When new entrants know the history of coordination in the group up to the moment 
of entering, then the more efficient coordination of a small group can be sustained also when 
it grows into a larger group. Weber (2006) then continues to argue that achieving efficient 
                                                                                                                                                         
reached, the financial incentives in Brandts and Cooper (2006a) apply to all but the least-efficient equilibrium. 
The latter makes it easier for groups to “climb up” to more efficient coordination. 
6 There are several experiments that can be interpreted as implying the use of costly communication (which 
then serves as a signaling device; see Crawford and Bruno Broseta, 1998). Van Huyck et al. (1993) have shown 
that adding a pre-play auction for the right to participate in a coordination game increases the efficiency of 
coordination, because the existence of a market price for playing the game serves as a coordination device in the 
equilibrium selection problem. Similar results have been presented by Gerard P. Cachon and Camerer (1996) and   5
coordination by managing growth may be one reason why firms and organizations that start 
out small may be successful in sustaining efficient coordination when they grow larger. 
In this paper, we test a related hypothesis, i.e., that firms and organizations may be 
successful at sustaining efficient coordination by setting up teams that coordinate internally at 
first, but then coordinate across teams. For instance, when launching a new product, several 
teams in a company (like the marketing, the R&D, or the accounting team) may have to 
coordinate their actions on the best way to proceed. By grouping individuals into teams (or 
divisions), a company can also reduce the number of players involved in coordination. Thus, 
the organizational feature of team decision-making may be seen as an attempt to facilitate 
efficient coordination in large companies. The recent emergence of network organizations 
also suggests that organizational structures relying on coordination among teams exhibit 
decisive advantages (for an overview, see Steve Cropper et al., 2008). To shed light on the 
validity of this conjecture, we run six different coordination game experiments with either 
teams of three subjects each or individuals as decision makers. Two games are weakest-link 
games (also widely known as minimum games), and four games are average-opinion games 
(also called median games in the literature). 
Our results show that teams are clearly better at avoiding miscoordination and 
coordinating an efficient equilibrium. Across all six games, teams earn on average about 20% 
more per capita than individuals. We explain the different behavior of individuals and teams 
by applying the experience weighted attraction learning model of Camerer and Teck-Hua Ho 
(1999). Teams are found in all games to be more attracted by payoff-dominant choices. 
Hence, their choices are guided much more by the opportunities for higher payoffs in more 
efficient equilibria, meaning that teams are more sensitive to payoffs, both those realized as 
well as hypothetical ones from strategies that were not chosen. 
                                                                                                                                                          
Ondrej Rydval and Ortmann (2005), who show that subjects’ loss avoidance makes coordination more efficient 
when there is a price to be paid for participation in a coordination game.   6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the coordination games 
that will be used in our experiments. Section 3 introduces the experimental design. Section 4 
reports the experimental results, and section 5 uses the experience weighted attraction 
learning model to explain the differences between individuals and teams. Section 6 relates our 
findings to the literature on team decision-making. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  The coordination games 
We have chosen two different types of coordination games for our study: weakest-link 
games and average-opinion games. Both types of games belong to the class of order-statistic 
games, with the minimum or the median of actions as the relevant order statistic. 
In weakest-link games, payoffs depend on the minimum number
7 chosen within a group, 
hence the connotation with the weakest link in a chain. In fact, the overall productivity of an 
organization often depends on the individual or unit doing the worst job. Think, for instance, 
of delays in air transport if the ground crew for fuelling is late. 
In average-opinion games, a decision maker’s payoff is increasing in the median number 
chosen in his group, but decreasing in the absolute difference between the own number and 
the group’s median.
8 Financial investments on stock markets provide a prime example for an 
average opinion game, as the most profitable action to take depends on the other investors’ 
(median) choices. Currency attacks may also be interpreted as an average-opinion game (see, 
e.g., Friedrich Heinemann, Nagel and Peter Ockenfels, 2004). 
 
                                                 
7 These “numbers” are also referred to as values, efforts, investments, or actions, in the literature. In general, 
the interpretation is that higher “numbers” imply higher personal costs, but nevertheless pay off when all other 
group members also choose higher “numbers”. 
8 For one of our average opinion games (SEPARATRIX, see below) the structure is slightly different.   7
2.1.  The two weakest-link games in detail 
The first weakest-link game (denoted WL-BASE henceforth, see panel [A] of Table 1) is 
taken from van Huyck et al. (1990). There are seven numbers to choose from. Payoffs 
increase in the minimum number chosen in the group, but decrease in the own number for a 
given minimum. Thus, the best response to a given strategy combination of the other players 
is to match the action of the “weakest link”, i.e., of the other player who has chosen the lowest 
number.  WL-BASE has seven pure-strategy, Pareto-ranked equilibria along the diagonal. 
Using the concept of payoff-dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) as an equilibrium 
selection device would lead to the choice of the only equilibrium that is not strictly Pareto-
dominated by any other equilibrium, hence to the equilibrium with the highest number. 
Applying the maximin-criterion, though, would induce players to choose the lowest number, 
since this choice guarantees the largest payoff in the worst possible case. Choosing such a 
“secure” action yields the least efficient equilibrium, however. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The second weakest-link game (denoted WL-RISK, see panel [B] of Table 1) has not been 
studied before. It keeps the property of Pareto-ranked equilibria, but reinforces the attraction 
of the maximin-criterion as a selection device since any number greater than “1” can lead to 
zero payoffs. Therefore, WL-RISK provides a stress-test of the relative importance of payoff-
dominance versus taking a secure action. 
 
2.2.  The four average-opinion games in detail 
The first three average-opinion games shown in Table 2 are taken from van Huyck et al. 
(1991), and the fourth one from van Huyck et al. (1997). Game AO-BASE in panel [A] has the 
payoff-dominant equilibrium again in the upper-left corner where all decision makers choose   8
“7”, but the action maximizing the minimum payoff is to choose “3” (rather than “1” as in the 
weakest link games). Still, AO-BASE entails a tension between payoff-dominance and taking 
a secure action. In order to separate the importance of forces, van Huyck et al. (1991) have 
developed the coordination games shown in panels [B] and [C] of Table 2. By setting all 
payoffs outside the diagonal to zero, applying the maximin-criterion can no longer help in 
discriminating between the different equilibria in AO-PAY. This leaves payoff-dominance as 
the most likely selection criterion. In AO-RISK (see panel [C]), the equilibria along the 
diagonal are no longer Pareto-ranked. This means that payoff-dominance provides no 
guidance in this game, yet the maximin-criterion suggests choosing “4”. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The game SEPARATRIX (see panel [D]) is also known as continental-divide game. It has 
a more complex choice set and two symmetric strict equilibria: {3, …, 3}, and {12, …, 12}.
9 
The interesting facet of this coordination game is that adaptive behavior in the repeated game 
(assuming either myopic best response or fictitious play) will lead to the Pareto dominated 
equilibrium of {3, …, 3} when the first-round median is “7” or lower, but to the payoff-
dominant equilibrium of {12, …, 12} when the first-round median is “8” or higher.  
 
 
3.  Experimental design 
We have set up two treatments in each of the six coordination games introduced above. In 
the “Individuals”-treatments we let five individuals interact in the respective game for 20 
                                                 
9 In the design of van Huyck et al. (1997) where groups included 7 subjects, there is also an efficient 
asymmetric equilibrium with four subjects choosing 14 and three subjects choosing either 13 or 12. van Huyck et 
al. (1997) never observed coordination on such an asymmetric equilibrium.   9
periods, and this partner matching is common knowledge. In each period, each individual has 
to choose independently a number from the feasible interval. 
The “Teams”-treatments are, in principle, identical to the corresponding “Individuals”-
treatments, except that a group of decision-makers consists of five teams – instead of five 
individuals. In the following we use the term “group” to denote the entity of players that 
interacts with each other. The “group size” is always five in our experiment. The term “team” 
refers to three subjects who are requested to arrive at a joint team decision by agreeing on a 
single number to be chosen by all team members. They can communicate via an electronic 
chat (in which only revealing one’s identity or using abusive language is forbidden). The 
experimental instructions (available in Supplement A) do not specify how team members 
should arrive at a team decision. Each team member has to enter the team’s decision 
individually on his computer screen.
10 In the Teams-treatments the payoffs in the matrix are 
understood as a per-capita payoff for each team member. This approach is taken to keep the 
individual marginal incentives constant across the Individuals- and Teams-treatments. 
The feedback given after each period is identical in the Teams- and Individuals-
treatments. Each decision-maker is informed about the own payoff and about either the 
minimum number, or the median, depending upon the game. This means that we do not reveal 
the full distribution of chosen numbers within a group, but only the relevant order statistic. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
                                                 
10 If different numbers were entered, team members could chat again and enter a decision once more. Only if 
the second attempt failed again the team received no payment in this period. Note that this happened only three 
times in all experiments (i.e., in 3 out of 3,900 cases where teams had to reach an agreement). In WL-BASE, one 
team could not reach an agreement in two out of 20 periods. In WL-RISK, one team could not reach an 
agreement in one period. For completeness, the instructions specified that if a team did not reach an agreement in 
a particular period, this team would be disregarded for determining the order-statistic. In the weakest-link games 
the minimum number submitted by the teams who reached an agreement is always unambiguous. In the average 
opinion games, the median may become a fractional number if only an even number of teams submitted a 
decision (such as when the valid submitted numbers were 2, 4, 5, 6, with a median of 4.5). In the latter case the 
median was randomly rounded up or down.   10
Table 3 summarizes our experimental design. In total, 825 subjects participated in the 
computerized experiment. We used zTree (Urs Fischbacher, 2007) for programming and 
ORSEE (Ben Greiner, 2004) for recruiting. The weakest-link games were run at the 
University of Cologne, and the average-opinion games at the University of Innsbruck. No 
subject was allowed to participate in more than one session. The average duration was 45 
minutes in Individuals-sessions, respectively 65 minutes in Teams-sessions. The exchange 
rate of points (indicated in Tables 1 and 2) into Euro was always 200 points = 1€. The average 
performance-related earnings were 9€ per subject, plus a show-up fee of 2.5€. 
 
 
4.  Experimental Results 
Table 4 presents an overview of the main data. In panel [A] it shows the average numbers 
chosen in the very first period. The first-period data are particularly interesting because these 
choices can not have been influenced by any history of the game. Therefore, the first-period 
data indicate “genuine” differences in coordination behavior between individuals and teams, 
irrespective of any differences due to learning. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Both in the first period as well as across all 20 periods (see panel [B] of Table 4) the 
average numbers of teams are always higher than those of individuals, and the differences are 
in most cases significant.
11 Only in game AO-RISK, the average numbers are practically the 
same for individuals and teams. Recall that AO-RISK is the only game, though, in which the 
                                                 
11 Note that for testing we can use all first-period choices, i.e., we can take all five numbers from each single 
group, because first-period choices are independent. When examining the average data across all 20 periods, we 
treat each group (with five decision-makers) as one independent unit of observation. Table 3 shows the number 
of independent observations at the group-level. Except for WL-BASE it is always 6.   11
different equilibria are not Pareto-ranked. All other games involve Pareto-ranked equilibria, 
and in these games we find clear differences between individuals and teams. 
 
Figures 1 to 4 about here 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the development of averages over single periods. In the five games 
where payoff-dominance applies, teams choose the higher numbers in each single period.
12 
This statement is also clearly supported by Figures 3 and 4, which present the relative 
frequencies of choosing a particular number.
13 In each single game with payoff-dominance, 
the distribution of numbers is shifted to the right by team decision-making. 
Turning from the chosen numbers to the actually resulting minimum, respectively 
median, number within groups, we see from panel [C] of Table 4 that teams generally succeed 
in coordinating on higher minimum or median numbers. As a consequence, teams have 
substantially and significantly higher payoffs than individuals, as can be seen in panel [D] of 
Table 4. Across all six games, teams earn on average about 20% more per capita than 
individuals. We summarize these findings in Table 4 in our first result: 
Result 1. Teams choose higher numbers, i.e., they target the more efficient equilibria rather 
than the more secure ones in all games where equilibria are Pareto-ranked. This yields 
significantly higher profits for teams. Only when payoff-dominance does not discriminate 
between the different equilibria do we find no differences between individuals and teams with 
respect to chosen numbers and profits. 
 
Table 5 about here 
                                                 
12 While in the weakest-link games choices of individuals and teams tend to go down over time, in three of 
the average opinion games the average of the chosen numbers goes up, in particular in the early periods. In the 
game AO-RISK the average numbers are virtually constant over time and identical for individuals and teams. 
13 For referees’ convenience, we show in Supplement B the distribution of chosen numbers in each single 
group and for each period separately.   12
 
The superiority of teams with respect to payoffs is also driven by a significantly smaller 
amount of miscoordination. Table 5 presents three different indicators for this statement. 
Miscoordination (in panel [A]) is measured as the average absolute deviation of each of the 
five chosen numbers from the actual minimum/median in a given group and period. This 
indicator is always larger for individuals than for teams, and again significant for all games 
with payoff-dominance. Panel [B] reports the relative frequency over all periods in which 
perfect coordination is achieved by all five decision makers choosing the same (not 
necessarily the most efficient) number. Except for SEPARATRIX, teams succeed in perfect 
coordination significantly more often than individuals in games with payoff-dominance. In 
AO-RISK, the relative frequency of perfect coordination does not differ between individuals 
and teams. The third indicator “adjustment” (see panel [C]) measures the absolute differences 
between a decision-maker’s number in period t and the minimum/median in period t–1. Table 
5 shows that there is always a higher level of adjustment activity in the Individuals-treatments 
than in the Teams-treatments, confirming once more that teams settle quicker for an 
equilibrium. This yields our next result: 
Result 2. Teams are more successful at avoiding miscoordination and settle into an 
equilibrium more quickly. 
 
 
5.  Econometric analysis by using the experience weighted attraction learning model 
In this section, we present an econometric analysis of learning in the six coordination 
games in order to explain in more detail why teams are much more successful in coordinating 
efficiently than individuals. We use the experience weighted attraction (EWA) learning model   13
of Camerer and Ho (1999).
14 In this model players’ strategies have attractions that reflect 
initial predispositions and are updated by taking into account past outcomes. In a nutshell, the 
EWA-model integrates reinforcement learning models and belief-based models (like fictitious 
play) into a single learning model. The following subsection offers a brief account of the 
EWA-model, which is then followed by a subsection presenting the estimation results and 
how learning differs between individuals and teams. 
 
5.1.  A brief account of EWA learning 
We start with notation. For each player (either individual or team) there are m pure 
strategies (m = 14 in SEPARATRIX, m = 7 in all other games). Let 
j
i s  be player i’s strategy j, 
and si(t), respectively s-i(t), the strategy of player i, respectively all other players’ strategies, in 
period t. At time t the relevant order statistic is denoted by z(t). Player i’s payoff of choosing 
strategy 
j
i s  in time t is  )) ( , ( t z s
i
j i π . 
For player i strategy j in period t has a numerical attraction  ) (t A
j
i , which determines the 






















The parameter λ represents the response sensitivity for mapping attractions into choice 
probabilities. If λ = 0, strategies would be chosen randomly, λ = ∞ would imply best response. 
The attractions for each strategy are updated after each period according to the following 
equation: 
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14 Ho, Camerer and Juin-Kuan Chong (2007) present a refinement of the original EWA-model, which they 
call self-tuning EWA. The latter model provides a one-parameter theory of learning. Ho et al. (2007) compare 
the estimation results of EWA (of Camerer and Ho, 1999) and self-tuning EWA, finding that for coordination 
games the EWA model has a slightly better fit (according to the Bayesian information criterion). This was the 
main reason for us to present the EWA-model instead of the self-tuning one here. In fact, we have also estimated 
the self-tuning EWA-model and found that both models yield very similar results.   14
where  N(t) is a weight on the past attractions following the updating rule 
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( + − − = t N t N κ φ . The indicator function I(x,y) is equal to zero if x ≠ y and one if x = 
y. Variables N(t) and  ) (t A
j
i  have initial values N(0) and  ) 0 (
j
i A , respectively, reflecting 
pregame experience. The parameter δ determines the weight put on foregone payoffs in the 
updating process. It places a positive weight on unchosen strategies only if  0 > δ . If  1 = δ  the 
attractions of all strategies (the one actually chosen and all others) are updated according to 
the payoffs these strategies have or would have generated, hence this covers fictitious play. 
The case of  0 = δ  captures pure reinforcement learning. Parameter φ  discounts previous 
attractions. A lower φ  reflects a higher decay of previous attractions due to forgetting or 
deliberate ignorance of old experience in case the environment changes. Parameter κ 
determines the discount rate of the experience weight N(t).
15 
For estimating parameters λ ,  φ ,  κ,  δ  and N(0) we determine initial attractions as 
follows. We assume, for each game and treatment, initial attractions equal to the expected 
payoff for each strategy, using the order statistic’s frequencies observed in the first period. 
For the same game and treatment we assume that initial attractions are equal for all players. 
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15 Note that Camerer and Ho (1999) formulate this slightly differently, albeit equivalently, in their paper.. 
They define  1 ) 1 ( ) ( + − = t N t N ρ . From the working-paper of the self-tuning EWA-model (Ho et al., 2001), it 
becomes clear that  ) 1 ( κ φ ρ − = , which we use here.   15
5.2.  EWA-estimates for individuals and teams 
In Table 6 we report the estimates for parameters λ , φ ,  δ , κ and  ) 0 ( N  in the EWA 
learning model.
16 It is particularly noteworthy that in each single game, teams have a larger λ 
than individuals, and this difference is statistically significant in all games.
17 This means that 
the sensitivity of teams to attractions is always larger. Hence, if teams and individuals faced 
equal attractions, teams would be more likely to choose the strategy with the highest 
attraction. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Moreover, in each single game, we observe a larger δ  for teams, and this difference is 
statistically significant in 4 games out of 6. This means that in the process of updating 
stragegies’ attractions, teams take into account the hypothetical payoffs from unchosen 
strategies much more than individuals do. In other words, teams are more of the fictitious-
play learning-type, whereas individuals are closer to a pure reinforcement learning-type. This 
difference between individuals and teams affects, of course, the dynamics of play since 
strategies with higher payoffs (even if not chosen) accumulate higher attractions, which are 
then chosen more likely by teams. As a consequence, team decisions are more heavily 
centered on higher numbers in all games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. This yields a larger 
degree of efficient coordination and ultimately higher payoffs for teams than individuals. 
In both weakest-link games we find a significantly lower φ  for teams, reflecting that they 
have a higher decay of previous attractions, meaning that the most recent play has a relatively 
stronger impact on the attractions. In other words, teams discard old experience more quickly. 
                                                 
16 The parameters are determined by a single estimation using all data of one treatment rather than computing 
the averages of parameters for each single group as defined in (5). 
17 Note that aggregate data for AO-RISK (in Figure 2) look very similar for individuals and teams, but the 
estimations show a strong difference in λ between individuals and teams. The larger λ for teams is due to teams 
deviating less (and less often) from previous medians than individuals.   16
In the average-opinion games, there is no clear-cut pattern concerning the difference between 
individuals and teams with respect to φ . Similarly, the estimates for κ as a discount rate of the 
experience weight N(t) do not point in the same direction in all games. Overall, the 
unambiguous differences in λ  and δ  are the most striking differences in learning between 
individuals and teams. These differences imply that settlement in an (efficient) equilibrium is 
quicker. The probability to play a strategy corresponding to the previous minimum, or 
median, is increasing in the parameters λ and δ , meaning that larger λ and δ  make it more 
likely that decision-makers choose in period t the order statistic of period t–1. This yields less 
miscoordination and quicker settlement in equilibrium in the Team-treatments. We summarize 
the insights from the EWA-learning model as follows: 
Result 3. According to the experience weighted attraction learning model, teams have a 
higher sensitivity to the different strategies’ attractions. Moreover, in the attraction updating 
process teams pay more attention to the payoffs of unchosen strategies. These facts imply a 
higher probability of playing more profitable strategies, leading ultimately to more efficient 
coordination when equilibria are Pareto-ranked. 
 
 
6.  Relation to the literature on team-decision making 
In recent years, behavioral differences between individuals and teams have attracted 
more and more attention in economics, because many economic decisions are made by teams, 
such as families, company boards, workgroups, management teams, committees, or central 
bank boards. In this section we relate our findings to this literature and highlight the 
contribution of our paper. 
When putting the analysis of team decision making on his list of top ten open research 
questions, Camerer (2003) conjectured that team decisions might be closer to standard game 
theoretic predictions (assuming selfishness and rationality) than individual decisions. In fact,   17
this conjecture has been confirmed for a variety of games.
18 For example, teams have been 
found to send and accept smaller transfers in the ultimatum game (Bornstein and Ilan Yaniv, 
1998) and to be less generous in the dictator game (Wolfgang Luhan, Martin G. Kocher and 
Matthias Sutter, 2008).
19 Teams send or return smaller amounts in the trust game (James C. 
Cox, 2002, Tamar Kugler et al., 2007) and exit the centipede game at earlier stages 
(Bornstein, Kugler and Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2004). They choose smaller numbers and 
converge quicker to the equilibrium in guessing games (Kocher and Sutter, 2005) and play 
more often strategically in signaling games (Cooper and John H. Kagel, 2005). 
Contrary to these earlier studies, the coordination games studied in this paper involve the 
issue of selecting among multiple equilibria, a task which has not been examined with teams 
so far. Nevertheless, there is a close link between the existing literature and our findings of 
more efficient coordination with team decision-making. One way to organize the evidence 
from the various games (like ultimatum, dictator, trust, centipede, beauty-contest, or signaling 
games) is that team decisions are more driven by a concern for monetary payoffs than 
individual decisions. A recent paper by Charness, Luca Rigotti and Aldo Rustichini (2007b) 
has shed light on the reasons for this effect. They have found in a prisoner’s dilemma game 
that the mere fact of becoming a group member lets individuals shift their decisions towards 
those that are more favorable, and profitable, for the group. Such a shift can explain our 
finding that team decisions in coordination games are more strongly driven by payoff-
dominance considerations. In fact, we have been able to confirm the importance of payoff-
dominance for the differences between individuals and teams by using the EWA learning 
model. We have found that teams are more sensitive in their decisions to the attractions of 
                                                 
18 There is also evidence from non-interactive decision-making tasks that team decisions comply more often 
with standard notions of rationality, like using Bayesian updating (see Tilman Slembeck and Jean-Robert Tyran, 
2004, in the context of the three-doors anomaly, or Charness, Edi Karni and Dan Levin, 2007a, for risky decision 
making) or applying logic to solve problems (such as the Wason selection task; see Boris Maciejovsky and 
David V. Budescu, 2007). 
19 The paper by Tim Cason and Vai-Lam Mui (1997) is often misinterpreted as showing that teams are more 
generous than individuals in a dictator game. However, Cason and Mui (1997) did not find that teams in general   18
different strategies and that they consider foregone payoffs (of unchosen strategies) more 
strongly when updating attractions. Since attractions are therefore linked to payoffs – with 
more profitable strategies getting higher attractions – it is clear that teams focus more on 
strategies with higher payoffs. This facilitates the coordination on more efficient equilibria. A 
larger sensitivity to attractions can also be interpreted as teams having a lower probability of 
choosing strategies with relatively low attractions (which they got because they were or would 
have been unprofitable in the past). As a consequence of this, teams are more steadfast in their 
decisions in the following sense. Ceteris paribus, teams are more likely than individuals to 
choose strategies with higher attractions in a given period t even if the performance of the 
particular strategy was not optimal in period t–1. In other words, individuals give up quicker 
in trying to reach a more efficient equilibrium when they have experienced miscoordination in 
the previous period. 
In sum, our paper contributes to the literature on team decision-making in the following 
ways: (i) It fills the gap of analyzing behavior of teams in coordination games. (ii) It provides 
a thorough analysis of learning of teams in these games and compares it to learning of 
individuals.
20 (iii) It uses six different games, rather than one particular game, to provide a 
comprehensive assessment of the differences between individuals and teams. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have shown that teams are persistently and remarkably better in 
achieving efficient outcomes in coordination games. This is particularly true in games where 
payoff-dominance can serve as an equilibrium selection device among several Pareto-ranked 
                                                                                                                                                          
are more generous than individuals, but only reported more other-regarding team choices when team members 
differed in their individual dictator game choices. 
20 Ho et al. (2007) have applied the self-tuning EWA model to examine Kocher and Sutter’s (2005) data on 
team decision data in a beauty-contest game. We are not aware of any other attempt to study how teams learn in   19
equilibria. Using the experience weighted attraction learning model of Camerer and Ho 
(1999) we have found that teams are much more sensitive to the attractions of different 
strategies. Since more profitable strategies get higher attractions, team decisions are more 
heavily influenced by monetary considerations than individual decisions. Furthermore, teams 
are steadfast in trying to achieve an efficient outcome, and they are much more successful in 
strictly best-responding (ex post) to what other teams do. 
Our findings add a novel, and hitherto overlooked, dimension to the recently flourishing 
literature on how efficient outcomes can be reached in coordination games. Previous studies 
have identified several factors that facilitate successful and efficient coordination (among 
individuals). From an organizational point of view, the use of financial incentives (Brandts 
and Cooper, 2006a, Hamman et al., 2007), the opportunity of communication (Blume and 
Ortmann, 2007) or managed growth (Weber, 2006) may be considered the most important of 
these factors. We have determined team decision-making as another major factor. It is 
important to note that teams coordinate more efficiently in two large families of coordination 
games, i.e., in weakest-link games as well as average-opinion games, provided that equilibria 
are Pareto-ranked. Therefore, our findings can be considered a robust phenomenon of team 
decision-making in coordination games. They lend support to the almost universal practice of 
firms and organizations to set up work teams as a means to enhance efficient interactions 
inside an organization and even in networks between organizations. 
                                                                                                                                                          
comparison to individuals. Hence, our focus on team learning in coordination games can be considered another 
contribution to the literature on team decision-making.   20
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Payoffs in the weakest-link games 
Smallest number chosen in the group  [A] WL-BASE 
Own number  7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
7  130  110  90 70 50 30 10 
6    120  100  80 60 40 20 
5      110  90 70 50 30 
4        100  80 60 40 
3       90  70  50 
2        80  60 
1         7 0  
 
Smallest number chosen in the group  [B] WL-RISK 
Own number  7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
7  130  0 0 0 0 0 0 
6    120  0 0 0 0 0 
5      110  0 0 0 0 
4        100  0 0 0 
3       90  0  0 
2        80  0 
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Table 2: Payoffs in the average-opinion games 
Median number chosen in the group  [A] AO-BASE 
Own number  7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
7  130 115  90  55  10  -45 -110 
6  125 120 105  80  45  0  -55 
5  110 115 110  95  70  35  -10 
4  85  100 105 100  85  60  25 
3  50 75 90 95 90 75 50 
2  5  40 65 80 85 80 65 
1  -50 -5 30 55 70 75 70 
 
Median number chosen in the group  [B] AO-PAY 
Own number  7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
7  130  0 0 0 0 0 0 
6  0  120  0 0 0 0 0 
5  0 0  110  0 0 0 0 
4  0 0 0  100  0 0 0 
3  0 0 0 0  90  0 0 
2  0 0 0 0 0  80  0 
1  0 0 0 0 0 0  70 
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Table 2 - continued 
Median number chosen in the group  [C] AO-RISK 
Own number  7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
7  70 65 50 25 -10  -55  -110 
6  65 70 65 50 25 -10  -55 
5  50 65 70 65 50 25 -10 
4  25 50 65 70 65 50 25 
3  -10 25 50 65 70 65 50 
2  -55  -10 25 50 65 70 65 
1  -110  -55  -10 25 50 65 70 
 
Median number chosen in the group  [D] SEPARATRIX 
Own number  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14 
1  45 49 52 55 56 55 46 -59  -88  -105 -117 -127  -135  -142 
2  48  53  58  62  65  66  61 -27 -52 -67 -77 -86 -92 -98 
3  48  54  60  66  70  74  72  1  -20 -32 -41 -48 -53 -58 
4  43 51 58 65 71 77 80 26  8  -2 -9 -14  -19  -22 
5  35 44 52 60 69 77 83 46 32 25 19 15 12 10 
6  23 33 42 52 62 72 82 62 53 47 43 41 39 38 
7  7  18 28 40 51 64 78 75 69 66 64 63 62 62 
8  -13 -1 11 23 37 51 69 83 81 80 80 80 81 82 
9  -37  -24  -11 3  18 35 57 88 89 91 92 94 96 98 
10  -65 -51 -37 -21  -4  15  40  89  94  98 101 104 107 110 
11  -97 -82 -66 -49 -31  -9  20  85  94 100 105 110 114 119 
12  -133 -117 -100  -82  -61  -37  -5  78  91  99  106 112  118  123 
13  -173 -156 -137 -118  -96  -69  -33  67  83  94  103 110  117  123 
14  -217 -198 -179 -158 -134 -105 -65  52  72  85  95  104  112  120 
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Table 3: Experimental design 
 
 










WL-BASE (Tab. 1 [A])  90  135  18  9  7  1 
WL-RISK (Tab. 1 [B])  30  90  6 6 7 1 
AO-BASE (Tab. 2 [A])  30  90  6 6 7 3 
AO-PAY (Tab. 2 [B])  30  90  6 6 7 - 
AO-RISK (Tab. 2 [C])  30  90  6 6 - 4 
SEPARATRIX (Tab. 2 [D])  30  90 6  6 12 3 
Note that “groups” refers to a unit of five decision makers, either five individuals or five teams. Teams always consist of 
three subjects who can communicate via an electronic chat. 
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Table 4: Main results 
  [A] Average numbers in 1
st period    [B] Average numbers overall 
Coordination game  Individuals   Teams    Individuals   Teams 
WL-BASE (Tab. 1 [A])  5.98  **  6.53    4.56  *  6.09 
WL-RISK (Tab. 1 [B])  5.37 *** 6.37    1.97    3.70 
AO-BASE (Tab. 2 [A])  5.67  6.17    6.57  **  6.94 
AO-PAY (Tab. 2 [B])  5.33 *** 6.43    6.04  **  6.95 
AO-RISK (Tab. 2 [C])  4.43  4.40    4.07  4.03 
SEPARATRIX (Tab. 2 [D])  7.90 ***  11.03   9.80  ** 12.63 
  [C] Average Minima / Medians    [D] Average payoffs  
  Individuals   Teams    Individuals   Teams 
WL-BASE (Tab. 1 [A])  3.91  **  5.79    92.6  **  114.9 
WL-RISK (Tab. 1 [B])  1.30  3.42    53.05  ***  85.03 
AO-BASE (Tab. 2 [A])  6.63  6.97    124.8  **  129.3 
AO-PAY (Tab. 2 [B])  5.99 ** 6.98  103.3  **  127.1 
AO-RISK (Tab. 2 [C])  4.00  4.00    68.5  69.6 
SEPARATRIX (Tab. 2 [D])  9.85 **  12.77  93.2  ***  114.2 
*** (**) [*]  significant difference between individuals and teams at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (Mann-Whitney U-test) 
All numbers chosen in the first period are used for testing (panel [A]), i.e., all five numbers from each single group. Note that 
all first-period choices are independent. When examining the average data across all 20 periods (panels [B]-[D]), we treat 
each group (with five decision-makers) as one independent unit of observation. 
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Table 5: Coordination and adjustment 
  [A] Miscoordination  [B] Perfect coordination  [C] Adjustment 
Coordination game  Indiv.  Teams   Indiv.  Teams   Indiv.  Teams 
WL-BASE  0.65  **  0.30  0.41 * 0.69  0.60 * 0.29 
WL-RISK  0.39  *  0.29  0.42 ** 0.77  0.53 ** 0.21 
AO-BASE  0.14  ***  0.06  0.75 ** 0.89  0.09 ** 0.03 
AO-PAY  0.25 ** 0.03  0.61 ** 0.92  0.34  *  0.02 
AO-RISK  0.12  0.04    0.75  0.91    0.10  0.01 
SEPARATRIX  0.84  ***  0.51  0.04    0.04  0.98  ***  0.56 
[A] Miscoordination is defined as the average of the absolute difference between a decision-maker’s number and the 
minimum/median in the same period. 
[B] Perfect coordination is defined as the fraction of periods where all five decision-makers choose the same number. 
[C] Adjustment is defined as average of the absolute difference between a decision-maker’s own number and the 
minimum/median in the previous period. 
*** (**) [*] significant difference between individuals (Indiv.) and teams at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (Mann-Whitney U-test) 
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Table 6: Parameter estimates of EWA learning model 
Game Parameter  Teams  Individuals  Game Parameter  Teams  Individuals 








































        








































           










































*** (**) [*]  significant difference between teams and individuals at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. 
Figures in brackets indicate standard errors   33
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Supplementary material (not necessarily intended for publication) 
 
Supplement A) Experimental instructions 
We provide a translation (from German) of the instructions for game WL-BASE in the teams-
treatment. The instructions for all other games and treatments were analogous. The complete 
set of instructions is available upon request. 
 
 
Welcome to the experiment. Please do not talk to other participants until the experiment is 
completely over. In case you have questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will 
assist you. 
 
Number of periods and decision-making units 
•  This experiment has 20 periods. 
•  There will be units of 15 participants each. You will only interact with members of the 
unit to which you are assigned throughout the whole experiment. Neither during nor after 
the experiment will you be informed of the identities of other members in your unit. 
 
Teams 
•  Within each unit there will be Teams of 3 subjects each. That means that each unit will 
have 5 teams. Teams will stay together for the entire experiment. 
•  Members of a given team will have to agree on a single decision for the whole team. To 
do so, members can exchange messages through an instant messaging system at the 
bottom of their screens. As soon as you press “Return” after having written a message, it 
will be visible on the two other members’ screens. You are allowed to send any message 
you like, except for those revealing your identity and except for using abusive language. 
If a team has agreed on a joint decision, each member has to enter this decision on his/her 
screen. In case the three entries are not identical, a team can go back to use the instant 
messaging system to agree on a joint decision. Then team members can enter the team’s 
decision a second time. Note that a team that does not manage to enter a joint decision at 
that stage will not get any payoff for the respective period. If one team within a unit fails 
to enter a joint decision of all three members, then this team will not be considered in the 
determination of the outcome for the other teams.   36
 
Sequence of actions within a period 
•  Choosing a number 
Each team has to choose a single number from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. Teams have to 
decide independently of other teams. After all teams have entered their number, you be 
informed about the smallest number chosen by any team in your unit (including your own 
team). 
 
•  Period payoff 
Your payoff (in Talers) depends on your own number (i.e., the number of your team) and the 
smallest number chosen by any team within your unit. The payoffs per member of a 
team are given in the following table. 
 
Payoff table (per team member) 
Smallest number in unit  Your 
number  7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
7  130  110 90 70 50 30 10 
6    120 100 80 60 40 20 
5      110 90 70 50 30 
4      100 80  60  40 
3       90  70  50 
2        80  60 




•  The earnings of each period are accumulated and exchanged at the end of the experiment 
as follows: 200 Taler = 1€. Each participant will receive his total earnings privately and 
confidentially. In addition to your earnings from the experiment, you will receive a show-
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Supplement B) Raw data 
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